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Abstract 
Are financial statement reviews, which are limited to primarily analytical procedures and inquiries, 
a cost-effective verification service for some firms? The answer is important for owner/managers 
considering reviews as well as investor/lenders, regulators, and those interested in effective 
verification mechanism design. Using data from U.S. private companies choosing to have financial 
statements compiled, reviewed, or audited, we calculate four model-based financial reporting 
quality proxies and, to reflect broader economics, the cost of debt and verification fee estimates. 
Consistent with application of prescribed verification procedures, we find both reviews and audits 
yield significantly better reporting quality scores and lower cost of debt than zero-verification 
compilations. However, model-based reporting quality scores of reviews and audits are 
indistinguishable statistically, on average. Regarding broader economics, we find that relative to 
compilations, reviews yield more than half the added interest rate benefit associated with an audit, 
at considerably less than half the added cost. Overall, our results suggest reviews may provide a 
cost-effective verification alternative to audits, and the potential of analytical procedures warrants 
more attention by audit researchers and regulators.    
  
Keywords: economics of verification, financial reporting quality, cost of debt, crowdfunding, confirmatory data 
analytics. 
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1. Introduction 
Extant financial reporting audit mandates suggest that regulators around the world view 
the aggregate market benefits of an independent financial statement audit as outweighing its cost, 
while many companies perceive little external benefits associated with an audit (Minnis and Shroff 
2017). The U.K. and other European countries that mandate statutory audits for private companies 
have also questioned the value-added and have raised the minimum entity size at which such audits 
are mandated (IAASB 2011, Gov.UK 2016).1 In response to this decline in private company audit 
mandates, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) recently enhanced 
standards for “limited verification” reviews to help smaller CPA firms provide intermediate 
verification benefits at lower cost (IAASB 2012).  
U.S. private firms’ choice of verification (assurance) level for GAAP-based annual 
financial statements is receiving broad attention.2 For example, in a 2011 report to the Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF), members of the “Blue Ribbon Panel” (FAF 2011) stated “[m]any 
Panel members believe that within the U.S. marketplace, significant, unnecessary cost is being 
incurred for GAAP financial statement preparation and audit, review, or compilation services.” 
Because U.S. private companies can choose whether to issue and to obtain independent verification 
of GAAP-based financial statements, each firm’s choice will reflect its individual cost-benefit 
tradeoff (Dedman et al. 2014). A recent working paper reports that almost two-thirds of medium 
to large private firms studied do not produce audited GAAP-based financial statements (Lisowsky 
and Minnis 2018).  
In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates annual audits of U.S. public 
company financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting as well as reviews of 
                                                          
1 Vanstraelen and Schelleman (2017) provides a review of the costs and benefits of private company audits. 
2 To focus on the procedural basis for assurance and related services, we will use the term “verification” level.  
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quarterly financial statements. However, under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act 
of 2012, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently allowed some smaller 
public issuers raising funds via crowdfunding to choose an independent review, a compilation, or 
to even to “go bare” with zero accounting or auditing services by a CPA firm (SEC 2016). Thus, 
U.S., U.K., and other European regulators believe reviews may be an acceptable alternative to 
mandated audits for smaller entities, but there is little empirical evidence on the relative benefits 
and costs of review-level verification services.  
There are several independent verification services available to private companies, which 
results in a wide range of verification procedures that may be applied by the CPA firm. 
Compilations require reading the financial statements for a GAAP format, but zero verification 
procedures and the CPA firm states that no “assurance of any form” is provided. Reviews are 
limited to primarily analytical procedures and inquiries of management as verification to express 
“limited assurance.” Audits apply analytical procedures and inquiries, but also require evaluation 
of internal controls over financial reporting as a basis for risk assessment and require verification 
of financial details as necessary to achieve “high but not absolute assurance” about possible 
material misstatement in audited statements.  
Despite the substantial difference in verification inputs, there is little empirical evidence 
on the resulting incremental benefits and costs across alternative GAAP-based financial statement 
verification services available or potentially available to public or private firms. We provide 
evidence using non-public data from two sources: A large sample of U.S. private company 
financial statement data applying U.S. GAAP from Sageworks, and a sample of compilation, 
review, and audit fees from a medium-sized U.S. CPA firm.3 
                                                          
3 Sageworks provides the accounting method used by each company with “accrual-based” indicating U.S. GAAP, 
along with “cash-based,” or “unknown.” We exclude all “cash-based” observations and conduct tests combining 
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As to verification effectiveness, there is no single definition or readily observable metric 
for evaluating reporting quality across various verification services for private companies in the 
U.S. The SEC, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Public Company 
Accounting Standards Board (PCAOB), and International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
(IFIAR) do not define financial reporting quality overall or verification quality as a component 
part, and PCAOB and IFIAR inspections of public company audit firms do not determine whether 
financial amounts are misstated (IFIAR 2018). Restatements of previously issued audited financial 
statements and lack of appropriate going concern audit references are possible quality indicators 
for public U.S. companies, but neither is available for private companies.  
In contrast, the CFA Institute Glossary does define “financial reporting quality” as “[t]he 
accuracy with which a company’s reported financials reflect its operating performance and their 
usefulness for forecasting future cash flows.” There is evidence that private firms’ audited annual 
financial statements are more useful those not audited, for example, using a sample of U.S. private 
firms, Minnis (2011) finds that cash flow predictability is higher for audited firms. In addition, for 
a large sample of U.K. private firms, Clatworthy and Peel (2013) find audited financial statements 
are about half as likely to be subsequently “amended” for accounting errors as non-audited 
financial statements.  Unfortunately, there is no counterpart to “amended” financial statements 
available for private companies in the U.S. Also, “restatements” for correction of materially 
misstated financial statements as exist for U.S. public companies are not available for U.S. private 
companies.  
                                                          
“accrual-based” with “unknown” observations. As a robustness test, we use only the “accrual-based” observations and 
our results are unchanged. 
 3 
 
Thus, for private U.S. firms, there is no authoritative definition financial reporting quality 
and no publicly available common indicators of poor accounting due to accounting misstates and 
lack of going concern warnings.  In this conceptual and publicly available data void, we conduct 
types of tests of verification service benefits using observable information.  
One test type is model-based, where each model uses only a firm’s financial statement 
amounts to provide a basis or proxy for assessing the “quality” of annual financial reporting. 
Specifically, we calculate four common model-based financial reporting quality proxies (denoted 
FRQPs) that apply a mathematical formula to reflect the likelihood of accounting misstatement.  
In particular, we calculate FRQP scores based on: (1) Benford’s Law (e.g., Durtschi et al. 2004; 
Amiram et al. 2015); (2) an accounting-fundamentals-based “fraud score” (Dechow et al. 2011); 
(3) unsigned abnormal accruals (e.g., Aobdia et al. 2015); (4) signed abnormal accruals (e.g., Jones 
1991; Collins et al. 2017), where a lower FRQP score indicates higher quality financial reporting. 
The other test type relates two economics-based measures.  First, we use cost of debt as a 
more comprehensive measure of verification service benefits resulting from the complex financial 
reporting environment. As an example, cost of debt may reflect lenders’ inferences from a firm’s 
verification service choice about the firm’s managerial integrity, future prospects, and better 
accounting records.4 Second, as a measure of verification service costs, we use a large sample of 
CPA firm service fees to estimate the verification fee for each firm in our sample.   
We find that model-based FRQP scores are generally lower for higher verification levels 
(indicating higher quality). The biggest FRQP difference is between compilation and review, with 
a relatively modest difference between review and audit. In particular, for our overall sample, 
                                                          
4 Moreover, prior studies have viewed lower cost of debt as a key benefit of higher verification levels, and as an 
indicator of lender-perceived quality of financial statements (e.g., Bandyopadhyay and Francis 1995; Blackwell et al. 
1998; Minnis 2011; Defond and Zhang 2014).  
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FRQP scores for reviews are statistically indistinguishable from audits. These full-sample results 
could be due to (a) financial reporting quality being on-average subject to rapidly diminishing 
marginal returns to CPA firm effort once analytical procedures and inquiry (i.e., review 
procedures) are applied, or (b) an inability of our FRQPs to detect the substantial verification input 
differences between reviews and audits (although our FRQPs detect input differences between 
compilation and review).5 
Regarding our economics-based measures, we use the subset of our private firms with 
outstanding debt and find that cost of debt for audited firms (reviewed firms) is 115 to 149 basis 
points (66 to 120 basis points) lower than compiled firms, where the cost of debt for audited firms 
is statistically significantly lower than for reviewed firms.6 As a comparison, Bandyopadhyay and 
Francis (1995) finds a 28 and 25 basis point difference (between compilation and reviews, and 
reviews and audits, respectively). As discussed below, they also find the likelihood of receiving a 
loan is substantially increased with audited financial statements. Thus, cost of debt relates and 
trades off multiple complex factors, and isolation of verification effects per se is difficult.  
Neither Sageworks nor regulators provide CPA firm fee data to allow assessment of net 
benefits of verification services. In this void, we obtain compilation, review, and audit fee data 
from a middle-market accounting firm for a sample of their clients (comparable in size to our 
sample firms) to estimate implied fees for each observation in our cost of debt subsample. We find 
that the cost of compilation, review, and audit for the average-sized sample firm is approximately 
$7,368, $15,120, and $27,726, respectively. Combining these estimates with our cost of debt 
                                                          
5 To explore whether model-based audit benefits arise in some settings, we also examine sample partitions where it is 
more likely that incremental audit procedures will reveal misstatement of details. 
6 Our evidence that reviewed financial statements are associated with lower cost of debt than compiled financial 
statements contrasts with findings in both Blackwell et al. (1998) and Minnis (2011), who note that they find no 
difference in cost of debt between reviews and compilations.  
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analysis suggests that, relative to compilation, reviews yield between 55% and 80% of the cost of 
debt benefits associated with an audit, but only 38% of the added fees.  
Both our model-based FRQPs and economics-based cost of debt and fee measures may 
reflect the service level as well as the complex underlying basis for selecting the service level, 
including knowledge of a firm’s pre-verification financial reporting quality. For example, firms 
with good internal controls and favorable prospects may choose to have financial statements 
audited, consistent with the bonding hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). We attempt to 
address endogeneity concerns by estimating propensity-score-weighted regressions, which is 
useful for studies with multiple treatments (Guo and Fraser 2015) and will help control for 
selection effects involving four levels of verification.7 Further, because time-invariant firm 
characteristics may be correlated with verification levels and FRQPs, we conduct an exploratory 
verification changes analysis and find evidence that provides support for our levels analysis. 
Overall, our study documents how verification levels across the entire CPA firm service 
spectrum are associated with output-based proxies for financial reporting quality, as well as an 
exploration of the broader economics of verification choice via a cost of debt analysis. We find 
reviews are associated with significantly better FRQPs than are compilations, and provide novel 
evidence that reviews and audits are associated with similar FRQPs, even though verification effort 
for audits is much greater. We find cost of debt differences consistent with market recognition of 
incremental reliability of financial statements among and between audits, reviews, and 
compilations and provide evidence that reviews may be a cost effective verification alternative, 
particularly for relatively small public entities.   
                                                          
7 Inferences from propensity-score-weighted regression are potentially threatened by selection on unobservable factors 
(Shipman et al. 2017). 
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Our results have implications for audit or review mandates, as well as the value of 
accounting expert compilation of financial statements using a mandated financial reporting 
framework. Our verification procedure analyses also provide a benchmark to evaluate the role of 
confirmatory data analytics (related to analytical procedures) in standards for both audits and 
reviews, as well as the precision and economics of the audit, review, and compilation markets.  
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses technical details of 
the various levels of financial statement verification that motivate our tests. Section 3 describes 
our research design and Section 4 outlines our data, sample selection, and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 presents our empirical analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Motivation 
2.1.  Verification services for private firms 
To meet market demand for high-quality independent verification services that fall outside 
SEC mandates, the AICPA has established Statements on Auditing Standards and Statements on 
Standards for Accounting and Review Services (SAARS).8 These standards provide guidance and 
a floor on input quality expected for each service by AICPA members, and also provide a basis for 
their clients and third-party users of financial information to differentiate reliability of financial 
statements by service level.9 All three services (i.e., audit, review, compilation) result in a CPA 
firm report and require accounting expertise, but differ substantially as to verification procedures 
required, the form of assurance given, and whether the CPA firm must be independent (e.g., not 
hold equity in the client).  
                                                          
8 The SEC has effectively made relevant SSARS No. 21 review standards in implementing its rules under Regulation 
CF (under provisions of the JOBS Act of 2012), which permits issuers of public securities via crowdfunding to provide 
reviewed (or less than reviewed), rather than audited, financial statements for certain levels of capital raising. 
9 SAARS No. 21 summarizes review, compilation, and preparation assistance standards. Unfortunately, preparation 
services do not result in a CPA firm report and cannot be tracked on a systematic basis via Sageworks or otherwise. 
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As summarized in Appendix A, CPAs conducting private company audits are required to 
evaluate the company’s risks of material misstatements based on understanding its industry, 
accounting practices, and internal controls; to evaluate relationships among and between recorded 
balances and other summary information using analytical procedures and inquiries of client 
management regarding any unexpected recorded results; and to selectively verify account balance 
details as necessary. This work effort is intended to provide “high, but not absolute” assurance that 
the statements are free of material misstatement. The auditor must also be independent and express 
a positive conclusion that “in our opinion,” the financial statements are fairly presented and 
properly apply GAAP. 
Reviews require CPA firm independence and a basic understanding of the client’s industry 
and accounting, and like an audit, must apply “top down” analytical procedures to resulting 
account balances and make inquiries of management regarding any unexpected relations among 
the balances. However, the reviewer CPA does not evaluate internal control or conduct any 
verification or substantiation procedures regarding particular account balances or details. If results 
of top-down analytical procedures applied to financial statements are reasonably in line with 
expectations based on the CPA’s expertise, or any matters that seem out of line have been resolved 
by explanations from management, then the reviewer’s verification is finished. The review is 
intended to allow “limited (or ‘moderate’) assurance” and is to be expressed in negative form as: 
“Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications needed to make the financial 
statements comply with GAAP in all material respects” (emphasis added). 
In a compilation, the CPA firm helps assemble data for GAAP-based financial statements, 
but provides no verification-related work. Rather, the CPA just “reads the financial statements in 
light of the stated financial reporting framework (e.g., GAAP) and considers whether the financial 
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statements are in the proper form and free from obvious material misstatement” (AICPA 2017). 
Also, the compiler need not be independent of the client, the compilation report states that there is 
no verification and “no assurance is expressed,” and will note any lack of independence. Moreover, 
compilations do not require footnotes. Appendix B provides examples of language commonly used 
by CPA firms for audit, review, and compilation reports.  
Thus, across verification levels, there is substantial variation in work effort and assurance 
attained and expressed. These differences make it clear that material misstatement likelihood 
depends on both the private company’s integrity, quality of internal control and choice of 
verification level, as well as the CPA firm’s performance whether as auditor, reviewer or 
compiler.10 For our study, it is important to note that review procedures are a subset of audit 
procedures and compilations have zero verification procedures. Therefore, comparison of reviews 
to compilations and audits allows incremental assessment of effectiveness of confirmatory data 
analytics and inquiries as the sole verification procedure, as well as the incremental contribution 
of internal control and detailed verification procedures of a “full audit.”  
2.2.  Prior literature 
Several recent studies find that audited annual financial statements are associated with 
better FRQP scores than are non-audited financial statements, but little is known about the 
association between FRQPs and reviewed annual financial statements. For U.S. private firms, 
Minnis (2011) investigates and finds that the predictability of accruals for future cash flows is 
higher for audited than non-audited financial statements (i.e., which include both reviews and 
compilations), and footnotes that this predictability does not appear to vary between reviews and 
compilations. In contrast, we isolate four levels of CPA firm verification: audits, reviews, 
                                                          
10 Because Sageworks (our data source) does not report private company or CPA firm identities, we cannot assess 
performance quality across CPA firms (e.g., Gaynor et al. 2016). 
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compilations, and no known association with a CPA firm (which we designate “company-
prepared” financial statements).   
Botosan et al. (2018) use a sample of U.S. public firm’s audited annual and related 
reviewed quarterly financial statements to compare FRQP scores using the Financial Statement 
Divergence (FSD) score based on Benford’s law (Amiram et al. 2015). They find that audited 
annual financial statements contain less “error” than the associated reviewed quarterly financial 
statements, but it is difficult to generalize their findings to private firms because of the significantly 
different regulatory and capital market environments. Also, because the CPA firm reviewing a 
public company quarterly filing also audits the firm’s subsequent annual filings (as well as year-
end internal controls), it is not clear such reviews are comparable to a stand-alone review of annual 
financial statements.  
Two prior studies consider alternative FRQP metrics for private firms. Foster et al. (2016) 
investigate the effect of different verification regimes (i.e., public company PCAOB-audit, private 
company GAAS-audit, and private company review) on a measure of “abnormal production” for 
a set of both public and private manufacturing firms in the U.S. They find that audited public 
(private) firms tend to engage in income-decreasing (income-increasing) real earnings 
management, and reviewed private firms seem not to engage in real earnings management.11 
Clatworthy and Peel (2013) use subsequent “amendments” to financial statements of U.K. private 
firms as an accounting quality measure to examine the impact of audits and governance. They find 
that unaudited financial statements are more likely to be amended than are audited financial 
statements. They leave unexplored the effects of “less than audit” verification levels.  
                                                          
11 GAAS-audit refers to an audit following AICPA standards for private firms, rather than use of PCAOB auditing 
standards, which are required for public issuers. 
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A related line of research documents private firms’ accounting and audit service choices 
from the users’ side. For example, what do lenders request from private firms when seeking 
information and monitoring loans, and how do private firms respond (Minnis and Sutherland 2017; 
Berger et al. 2017; Lisowsky et al. 2017)? This research reveals financial statement-related 
information and assurance desired by lenders, and the resulting information supplied in a market 
without financial reporting regulation. These related papers do not measure verification costs or 
provide evidence on the association between verification services and FRQPs.  
In addition to investigating the association between verification services and FRPQs, we 
examine the association between verification services and cost of debt. The motivation underlying 
this analysis is the potential that cost of debt may capture some benefits of verification services 
that are not captured by FRQPs. The belief that higher assurance levels reduce a firm’s cost of debt 
is well established among policymakers. For example, Levitt (1998) suggests that regulators 
“recognize the ultimate advantage of an efficient and trustworthy financial reporting system – a 
lower cost of capital.” More narrowly focused on audits, PCAOB chairman, James Doty, is much 
more specific and maintains:  
“Whether the audit is compulsory or not, the companies seeking capital pay for audits to 
receive a benefit. That benefit is in the form of a lower cost of capital than capital-market 
participants would otherwise require, access to more capital markets, and greater investor 
demand for their securities” (Doty 2014).  
 
Scholarly studies also provide evidence that audits are associated with a lower cost of debt. 
In an experiment with 67 bankers, Bandyopadhyay and Francis (1995) find that reviews yield 
lower cost of debt than compilations (28 basis points), and audits yield lower cost of debt than 
reviews (25 basis points). Also, as an indication of the complex interaction among factors, they 
find that the bankers’ assessment of the probability of making a loan is 0.26, 0.48, and 0.62 when 
a borrower has compiled, reviewed, and audited financial statements, respectively. Blackwell et 
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al. (1998) use 212 revolving credit agreements from six banks and estimate that firms with audited 
financial statements pay lower interest rates (about 25 basis points), and that this interest rate 
reduction covers from 28% to 50% of typical audit fees. The authors also note that reviews cost 
about one-third the cost of an audit. Minnis (2011) uses the Sageworks dataset and finds that 
audited financial statements are associated with lower cost of debt.  
Blackwell et al. (1998) do not separately estimate differences in cost of debt between 
reviews and compilations or between reviews and audits. Minnis (2011, p. 494) finds no difference 
in cost of debt between reviews and compilations. We extend Bandyopadhyay and Francis (1995), 
Blackwell et al. (1998), and Minnis (2011) by conducting exploratory and limited comparative 
cost-benefit analyses among and between CPA firm verification services using (a) cost of debt as 
an important component of firms’ cost of capital, and (b) an estimate of verification service fees.   
Understanding the benefits and costs of alternative verification services in general, and 
reviews in particular, is important because reviews may be a cost-effective alternative to audits for 
both public and private firms. As pointed out above, under Regulation CF the SEC already permits 
public firms in certain circumstances to file reviewed, rather than audited, financial statements. 
Further, audits are becoming costlier due to new regulations and the increasing complexity of U.S. 
GAAP, and the cost effectiveness of reviews will likely be strengthened by advances in data 
analytics and software (Murphy and Tysiac 2015).12 
3. Research Design                   
3.1. Primary empirical specification 
To examine the association between verification level and verification outcome measures, 
we use OLS to estimate the following regression model, with standard errors clustered by firm:  
                                                          
12 Badertscher et al. (2014) provide some evidence on the relative cost of private firm audits in a study of public debt 
issuers with private equity. 
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where VOM (verification outcome measure) represents either one of our four alternative model-
based FRQPs (described below), or cost of debt. Compile (Review, Audit) is an indicator that equals 
one if firm i’s year t financial statements were compiled (reviewed, audited) and zero otherwise, 
and the intercept includes company-prepared statements. 
Following Minnis (2011) and Hope et al. (2013), we include the following control variables 
for firm i in year t: natural log of total assets (LnAssets); percentage change in sales squared 
(SalesGrowthSq) to capture non-linearities in the relation between sales growth and reporting 
quality (Collins et al. 2017); debt-to-assets ratio (Leverage); the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (CurrRatio); an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a Subchapter C 
corporation and zero otherwise (CCorp); property plant and equipment deflated by total assets 
(PPEta); an indicator variable that equals one if total shareholders’ equity is negative (NegEquity); 
and interest coverage ratio (IntCoverage). In Eq. (1), β1 (β2, β3) estimates the effect of a 
compilation (review, audit) on verification outcome measures relative to company-prepared 
statements. 
Because private companies are able (to some degree) to select verification level, there is 
concern about endogeneity when interpreting the results from estimating Eq. (1). To mitigate this 
concern we also estimate propensity-score-weighted (PSW) regressions (McCaffrey et al. 2013; 
Austin and Stuart 2015; Guo and Fraser 2015), a popular method of addressing self-selection that 
is applicable for studies with multiple treatments, and preserves all observations for use in the 
regression estimation. The PSW estimation is conducted in two steps. First, we estimate the 
following multinomial logistic model (Guo and Fraser, 2015), which employs the same set of 
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determinants used in Eq. (1) and is consistent with determinants used in existing audit choice 
models (e.g., Kausar et al. 2016; Minnis 2011): 
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  (2) 
where Assur equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 if firm i’s year t financial statements are company-prepared, 
compiled, reviewed, or audited, respectively, and all other variables are as previously defined. Eq. 
(2) yields a generalized propensity score corresponding to each of the four verification levels for 
each sample observation (i.e., each observation receives a score that indicates the likelihood that 
the observation has company-prepared, compiled, reviewed, and audited financial statements, 
based on the firm characteristics included in the model).13 Then, for each observation we retain 
only the generalized propensity score that corresponds to the actual treatment (e.g., for an 
observation that received an audit, we retain the generalized propensity score for “audit”).  
In the second step, we estimate Eq. (1) using the inverse of each observation’s generalized 
propensity score as a sampling weight. To mitigate the impact of outlier weights, we normalize 
each observation’s inverse propensity score by multiplying it by the expected value of being in the 
respective treatment (a technique referred to as “stabilization” – see Harder et al. 2010). For a 
sensitivity test, we also trim observations with very high and low inverse propensity scores.14  
                                                          
13 Because there are four Assur indicator variables, the multinomial logistic model estimates three models with one 
Assur level used as the referent group, which leads to 24 estimated coefficients, not including fixed effects (i.e., 8 
predictors times 3 models). In this untabulated estimation, 22 of the 24 coefficient estimates are significant at the 
p<0.01 level, and the pseudo-R-squared is 34.58%. 
14 It must be noted that, although this approach helps mitigate the potential confounding effect of self-selection, it is 
subject to the same concerns and assumptions inherent in propensity score matching (Minnis 2011; Shipman et al. 
2017). That is, inferences are susceptible to selection on unobservables if the observable variables included in the 
model do not account for all differences in treatment. 
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3.2. Model-based financial reporting quality proxies 
 There is no universally accepted FRQP for public companies (Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014) and perhaps even less agreement for private companies (Hope et al. 2013).15 
Therefore, we consider four FRQPs broadly used in extant literature (recognizing that each has 
conceptual limitations, as discussed below), each of which is inversely related to reporting quality 
(i.e., lower values are associated with better reporting quality).  
First, we consider a “Financial Statement Divergence Score” (FSDScore) based on 
Benford’s Law. Benford’s Law describes the theoretical distribution of all “first digits” that appear 
in a given naturally occurring population of numbers, has been shown to apply to financial 
statement data (Amiram et al. 2015), and has been advocated as a test for reliability of accounting 
data in the auditing literature (e.g., Nigrini and Mittermaier 1997; Durtschi et al. 2004; Nigrini and 
Miller 2009). Following Amiram et al. (2015) we measure FSDScore using the mean absolute 
deviation statistic: 
 , , , / ,
K
i t k i t k
k 1
FSDScore AD TD K

 
  
 
   (3) 
where AD is the actual distribution of each leading digit for each line item in firm i’s year t financial 
statements, TD is the theoretical distribution of each leading digit under Benford’s Law, and K is 
the number of distinct leading digits for line items that appear in firm i’s year t financial 
statements.16 Larger values of FSDScore are presumed to reflect accounting errors whether 
accidental or intentional (i.e., fraudulent), and thus lower financial reporting quality. One 
advantage of FSDScore relative to accrual-based FRQPs (described below) is that there is no clear 
                                                          
15 Hope et al. (2013) find that relative to public firms, private firms show lower accrual quality and less conservatism. 
16 We include all financial statement data items that appear in Sageworks for a given year, which include data from 
the income statement and balance sheet. The average number of data items for a firm-year is 74.  
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reason why a measure based only on properties of numerical distributions would be ex-ante 
correlated with innate firm characteristics, which mitigates endogeneity concerns.  
Our second FRQP (FScore) is based on the material misstatement likelihood measure 
developed by Dechow et al. (2011). Because some Dechow et al. (2011) predictors either do not 
apply or are not available for our private firms (e.g., stock market data, off-balance-sheet 
variables), we compute FScore using the corresponding data that we have available, as follows: 
 
-7.893 0.790*( ) 2.518*( ) 1.191*( )
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   
  
  (4) 
where the component variables are as defined in Appendix C (within the definition of FScore). 
We then compute FScore as: 
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where larger values of FScore imply a higher probability of material accounting misstatement.  
Our third and fourth FRQPs are two traditional accrual-based measures from a variant of 
the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model. Specifically, we first estimate the following 
regression annually for each two-digit NAICS industry with at least ten observations: 
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  (6) 
where Accruals is total accruals, Assets is total assets, ΔSales is annual change in sales, 
ΔReceivables is the change in trade receivables, PPE is net property, plant, and equipment, ROA 
is return on assets (Kothari et al. 2005), and SalesGrowth is the percentage change in sales from 
year t-1 to year t (Collins et al. 2017). All variables are further defined in Appendix C. The residual 
from Eq. (6) is a proxy for discretionary, or “abnormal” accruals (AbAccruals) (Jones 1991). 
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Following prior studies, our third FRQP is the unsigned residual, |AbAccruals|, which is generally 
interpreted as a measure of reporting quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Aobdia et al. 2015). 
Our fourth FRQP is the signed residual, AbAccruals, which is generally interpreted as a measure 
of directional earnings management.  
As to limitations of these FRQPs, FSDScore is devoid of accounting intuition that 
facilitates economic interpretation, and FScore, to our knowledge, has not been validated for 
private firms. A key disadvantage of the accruals-based FRQPs is that discretionary accruals 
estimated using a Jones-model approach are correlated with firm economic fundamentals.17  
3.3. Cost of debt   
As discussed above, our economics-based VOM benefits measure, cost of debt, reflects not 
only observable financial reporting quality (as do model-based FRQPs), but also reflects individual 
borrower and lender choices based on management’s knowledge of its own unobservable quality, 
integrity, and future prospects for the entity, as well as the lender’s perception and other contextual 
factors (e.g., implicit lender “insurance” from the CPA firm that comes with higher verification 
levels). To assess the association between verification services and cost of debt, we estimate Eq. 
(1) with CostOfDebti,t+1 as VOM, where we follow Minnis (2011) and measure CostOfDebt as 
interest expense in year t+1 divided by average debt (Debt) outstanding in year t+1 (where Debt 
equals total liabilities). Also as in Minnis (2011), we truncate CostOfDebt at the upper and lower 
5% levels, and code CostOfDebt as missing for any firm years where Debt more than doubles or 
reduces by half relative to the prior year. 
                                                          
17 As examples, see Hribar and Nichols (2007); Dechow et al. (2010); Ball (2013); DeFond and Zhang (2014); Owens 
et al. (2017).  
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3.4.  Verification service fees 
To explore the relative costs as well as benefits of an audit, review, or compilation we 
obtain confidential verification service fee data from a mid-market accounting firm based in the 
U.S. that serves private firms similar in size to those in Sageworks. Our fee data are from 424 
unique engagements (the “full-fee sample”) comprised of 50 compilations, 138 reviews, and 236 
audits from 2015 and 2016 for which no client appears more than once. We also separately 
consider a subset of these fee data for client firms with assets from $1.94 million to $7.50 million 
to provide even better overlap with our Sageworks firms (the “size-representative-fee sample”), 
comprised of 179 unique engagements (76 audits, 77 reviews, and 26 compilations). We do not 
have client firm identities, and the only data (aside from verification service level) we have for 
client firms is total assets, which ranges from approximately $58 thousand to $488 million in the 
full-fee sample.  
We estimate the following model to obtain cost coefficients for each service level using 
both the full-fee sample and the size-representative-fee sample: 
 
*
* * ,
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i
4 i 5 i
AssurFees Compile Review Audit Compile Assets
Review Assets Audit Assets
   
  
    
 
  (7) 
where AssurFees is the fee associated with the CPA firm verification service, Compile, Review, 
and Audit indicators estimate fixed costs for each verification level, and each verification level is 
interacted with Assets to estimate variable costs. We use the estimated coefficients from Eq. (7) to 
compute implied fees for our Sageworks observations to allow possible insights into the relative 
costs and benefits of different verification service levels. 
 We consider this analysis to be exploratory and suggestive, rather than definitive, due to 
data limitations. Our fee data are from clients that overlap substantially with our Sageworks sample 
in terms of firm size; therefore, results that combine fee and cost of debt evidence are not likely 
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affected by size differences. However, we have no insights into comparative market areas, market 
conditions, or decisions of private company client management or lenders. Despite these 
limitations, our financial and verification service fee data are the most comprehensive of which 
we are aware for private firms. 18 Therefore, this analysis should be of some help to scholars and 
regulators wishing to assess the costs relative to the benefits of each verification service level.  
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.  Sample selection 
We obtain firm-year financial statement data for private firms from Sageworks, Inc.19 
Sageworks contains both income statement and balance sheet items (similar to the corresponding 
data structure in Compustat for public firms), but does not provide statement of cash flow data. 
Additionally, Sageworks provides the verification service level chosen for each firm-year of 
accounting data, and basic demographic information such as geographic location and North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes. This unique combination of 
data allows us to explore the association between financial reporting quality and verification 
service levels.20  
Table 1 details our Sageworks sample selection process. Following Minnis (2011) and 
Badertscher et al. (2013), we exclude Canadian firms, as well as observations with missing 
financial data or for which the accounting numbers fail to satisfy basic accounting identities (which 
                                                          
18 Abdel-Kahlik (1989) reports a difference in audit and review fees of $9,000. We are not aware of any other fee data.  
19 Sageworks collects private firm financial data from banks and accounting firms, including large national accounting 
firms and smaller regional firms. Sageworks collects confidential financial statement information of non-listed clients 
of large and regional accounting firms, and sells the data, aggregated by industry and region, with financial tools to 
its clients who are the accounting firms, banks and other financial institutions. For research purposes only, Sageworks 
granted some researchers confidential access to the non-aggregated data with firm names removed and unique firm 
identifiers substituted. This dataset has recently been used in several accounting and finance studies (e.g., Minnis 
2011; Badertscher et al. 2013; Badertscher et al. 2014; Hope et al. 2013; Lisowsky and Minnis 2018). 
20 Sageworks assigns each firm a unique firm identifier that cannot be matched with any other data set, and the CPA 
firm providing the verification services are not identified or characterized in any way.   
 19 
 
suggests data errors). We follow Badertscher et al. (2013) and exclude financial firms (finance and 
insurance industries, NAICS code 52) and utilities (NAICS code 22) because of their different 
business models. Finally, we exclude firms with total assets less than $1 million, and we winsorize 
all continuous variables at 1% and 99%. The data span ten fiscal years from 2001 through 2010. 
We have a total of 103,114 firm-years and 41,280 firms with all necessary variables (the “full 
sample”). To maximize balance in sample coverage of various verification levels and reduce the 
risk of size-driven results, we focus on a sub-sample of observations with assets in the middle 
deciles of the full sample (i.e., assets ranging from $1.94M to $7.5M) (the “size-representative 
sample”), which consists of 51,557 firm-year observations across 22,782 distinct firms.21 
4.2. Verification services by size and industry 
To better understand how verification service levels vary with firm size, we partition our 
full sample into deciles based on total assets. Panel A of Table 2 reports the frequency of audit, 
review, compilation, and company-prepared financial statements for each asset decile. For 
instance, in the smallest asset decile, the percentage of audit, review, compilation, and company-
prepared statements is 6.0%, 40.6%, 51.6%, and 1.8% respectively. In contrast, in the largest asset 
decile, the percentages are 60.9%, 20.0%, 18.0%, and 1.1% respectively. For the middle deciles, 
service levels are more nearly equal. It is noteworthy that a sizeable number of very large firms 
obtain reviews and compilations and a non-trivial number of very small firms obtain audits. 
 For perspective, we obtain a comparative sample of public firms from Compustat that meet 
the same data availability criteria. The median (10th percentile) audited public firm has total assets 
                                                          
21 Throughout our analyses, inferences are unaltered if we instead use the full sample. In addition, we also examine a 
“constant sample” (20,324 firm-year observations) comprised of 5,081 firms that are in the full sample in all years 
from 2005-2009 (chosen because this period coincides with the broadest coverage available within Sageworks) to 
ensure that our results are not driven by firms that exit the sample. All results are similar when examining the constant 
sample. 
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of $198 ($3.7) million. Accordingly, although our private firm sample is considerably smaller in 
size than a typical public firm sample, our sample contains approximately 23,869 firms (56,072 
firm-years) that would be at or above the 10th percentile of assets in the public-firm distribution. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the largest percentage of private firms is in the Construction and 
Construction Materials industry, followed by Wholesale.22 The distribution of public and private 
firms across industries is generally similar.  
 Across all industries the average percentage of firm years receiving audit assurance is 
22.6%, yet there is considerable variation among industries. For example, Retail has only 15.0% 
of firm-years receiving an audit, while Tobacco Products has 64.7%. Similarly, the average 
percentage of firm years receiving a review is 44.3%, yet Construction and Construction Materials 
has 54.5% while Petroleum and Natural Gas has only 9.0%. As another example of industry-level 
variation, the average percentage of firm years receiving a compilation is 31.8%, yet Restaurants, 
Hotels, Motels has 47.6% while Tobacco Products has only 17.6%. 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 present descriptive statistics for the full sample and size-
representative samples as a whole and within each verification category. By construction, the size-
representative sample has lower mean Assets than the full sample (5.369 vs. 9.591). Descriptive 
statistics of all other variables are of the same general magnitude across samples, which highlights 
that the basic relations in the data are not driven by firms in the tails of the size distribution. 
Accordingly, we focus discussion on the size-representative sample.  
The univariate statistics reveal a fairly systematic pattern in the data. Specifically, mean 
FSDScore increases monotonically from the audited statements (0.053) to the company-prepared 
                                                          
22 We asked a CPA firm partner to explain the concentration of construction clients and were told that much of this is 
due to bonding requirements for construction companies. 
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statements (0.056). FScore likewise generally increases as verification levels decrease, although 
reviewed statements have a slightly lower FScore than do audited statements. For |AbAccruals|, 
the mean and median across all observations is 0.099 and 0.069, respectively, which is similar in 
magnitude to corresponding data from public-firm studies (Owens et al. 2017) and other private-
firm studies (Hope et al. 2013). Review firm years have the lowest mean |AbAccruals| (0.097). 
CostOfDebt is lowest for the Audit firm years (0.073) and highest for Compile firm years (0.120). 
The overall mean and median CostOfDebt is comparable to descriptive statistics in Minnis (2011).  
Turning to the control variables, we note that firms in the size-representative sample are 
not “mom-and-pop” firms, with mean (median) assets of $5.4 ($4.8) million. As expected, audited 
firms are the largest, on average. Specifically, mean Assets across audited, reviewed, and compiled 
firm years are $6.1, $5.3, and $4.9, respectively. Aside from size, we note no particular patterns in 
control variables across verification levels, reinforcing the need to control for firm size in our 
multivariate regressions. Overall, the control variables have similar distributional properties as 
those reported in Minnis (2011) and Badertscher et al. (2014). 
 Panel C of Table 3 displays the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the size-
representative sample. Consistent with the descriptive statistics in Panels A and B, higher levels 
of verification are generally associated with better FRQP scores. For example, Audit (Compile) is 
negatively (positively) correlated with FSDScore. Audit is positively correlated with Assets, 
SalesGrowth, and Debt, while Compile and Review are negatively correlated with these variables. 
These findings suggest that firms that are larger and have more growth opportunities tend to obtain 
higher levels of verification. Overall, the correlation patterns are consistent with prior work 
(Minnis 2011; Badertscher et al. 2014).  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Verification service levels and financial reporting quality 
 Table 4 presents results from estimating Eq. (1) for the size-representative sample, using 
our four alternative FRQPs. We report results from both OLS regression and propensity-score-
weighted regression, and although we focus on the OLS results, note that our results are 
remarkably similar across approaches. The coefficients on Compile, Review, and Audit capture 
incremental effects of verification relative to company-prepared financial statements, which is 
included in the intercept. There are two key takeaways from Table 4. First, FRQP scores are 
generally lower for higher verification levels (indicating better financial reporting quality), where 
most differences are statistically significant. Second (and somewhat surprisingly), audits and 
reviews have similar FRQP scores, where in some cases audited FRQPs are nominally worse than 
reviews. 
 As reported in Column (1) (where FSDScore is the FRQP), the coefficients on Compile, 
Review, and Audit are all significantly negative, with a monotonically increasing (absolute) 
coefficient magnitude as verification level increases. This provides evidence that CPA firm 
involvement of any kind is positively associated with reporting quality. In pairwise comparisons, 
the coefficients on Compile and Review are 0.0021 and 0.0041, respectively, where an F-test 
indicates that the two coefficients are significantly different. This suggests that a financial 
statement review is associated with better reporting quality than a compilation. An F-test of the 
Review and Audit coefficients (0.0041 vs. 0.0045, respectively) reflects a significant difference, 
suggesting that an audit results in better reporting quality than a review. Column (2) reports similar 
results using propensity-score-weighted regression. Thus, even after addressing the potential self-
selection problem, the FRQP benefits of an audit relative to a review seem quite modest. 
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The results in Columns (3) through (8) using other FRQPs show one salient contrast with 
the results in Columns (1) and (2). Namely, audits and reviews generally exhibit statistically 
indistinguishable FRQPs. For example, Column (3) presents results using FScore as the FRQP and 
shows both reviews and audits are associated with better FRQP scores relative to compiled 
financial statements, but audit and reviews have statistically indistinguishable FRQP scores. As 
another example, Column (5) presents results using unsigned abnormal accruals (|AbAccruals|). 
Consistent with Column (1), the coefficients on Compile, Review, and Audit are all significantly 
negative (p-value < 0.01), which again provides evidence that CPA firm involvement of any kind 
is positively associated with reporting quality. F-tests again indicate that reviews leads to 
significantly better FRQPs than compilations, but there is no statistical difference between reviews 
and audits. Further, in columns (3) through (6) (i.e., FScore and |AbAccruals|), reviews are 
nominally superior to audits and for the PSW column (6) review and audit scores are significantly 
different (at p = 0.10) in favor of reviews. Likewise, Columns (7) and (8) (which uses signed 
abnormal accruals) show no significant FRQP difference between reviews and audits. Overall, our 
results suggest that, on average, audits and reviews exhibit little difference in model-based FRQPs.  
5.2. Relative importance of audit-specific verification procedures 
 To test whether the modest FRQP difference between reviews and audits applies across 
contexts, we test for FRQP differences for a subset of firms where “full audit” verification 
procedures would be expected to be more effective—firms with large inventories, which are often 
subject to internal control problems and accounting errors or manipulation for which control 
evaluation and detailed counting and pricing tests should be diagnostic. We partition sample firm-
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years that have a low-to-moderate versus high inventory-to-total-asset ratios by bifurcating at the 
75th percentile (0.331), and estimate Eq. (1) separately for each partition. 
 Table 5 presents OLS results (again, using the size-representative sample), where columns 
(1)-(4) (columns 5-8) report results for the low-to-moderate (high) inventory percentage partition. 
Inferences from the low-to-moderate inventory partition mimic those of our primary analyses. 
Specifically, there is no statistical difference in scores between review and audits using any of our 
four FRQPs. In contrast, there are markedly better scores for audited relative to reviewed financial 
statements for the high inventory percentage group using all four FRQPs, consistent with the 
notion that “context matters” when it comes to the question of whether the additional control and 
detailed verification procedures that come with an audit yield reporting quality benefits.  
5.3.  Verification service levels and cost of debt 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1) for the size-representative sample using 
CostOfDebt in year t+1 as the dependent variable. Column (1) presents OLS estimates of audit 
effects on cost of debt, relative to reviews, compilations, and “unknown” association combined 
with other factors in the (suppressed) intercept. Audited firm years are associated with an interest 
rate advantage of 77 basis points relative to non-audited firm years. This is consistent with Minnis 
(2011), who found that audit (versus all non-audit) cases ranged between 25 and 105 basis points, 
depending on specification, as well as Blackwell et al. (1998), who find a 25 basis point advantage 
for audits. Columns (2) and (3) isolate estimates of the compilation and review effects. There are 
negative and significant coefficients on Review and Audit, whereas Compile is insignificant, 
consistent with relatively little effect on cost of debt from obtaining a GAAP-compliant financial 
statement compilation with no assurance provided. However, as indicated by the F-tests, there is a 
significant reduction in cost of debt among and between compilations, reviews, and audits. For 
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example, the OLS coefficient estimates on Compilation, Review and Audit in Column (2) are 
0.0021, 0.0083 and 0.0136, respectively, suggesting that firms with reviews average 62 basis 
points less than compilations, and 53 basis points more than audits.  
In summary, the cost of debt analysis in Table 6 is consistent with the model-based FRQP 
analysis in Table 5 in that both reviews and audits have a larger effect than compilations, and 
reviews are associated with a substantial portion of the full benefit differential between 
compilations and audits. In contrast, there is also a statistically significant and economically 
important difference in the cost of debt between audited and reviewed financial statements, which 
suggests that the economics-based cost of debt measure indeed may reflect benefits associated 
with the audit service that model-based FRQPs do not capture.23 
5.4.  Exploratory cost/benefit analysis 
To complete our economics-based net benefits analysis, we explore the relation of 
verification service fees to cost of debt benefits. Panel A of Table 7 presents results from estimating 
Eq. (7). Due to the small number of compilations in the size-representative-fee sample, we focus 
on the full-fee sample (Column 1) for discussion. The fixed cost coefficients on Compile, Review, 
and Audit are 5,514, 14,584, and 23,584, and the variable cost coefficients are 0.1334, 0.0043, and 
0.2079, respectively; all of which are statistically significant with the exception of review variable 
cost, which is near zero. As shown in Panel B, these estimates translate to an implied fee for a 
compilation, review, and audit of $6,417, $14,550, and $27,702, respectively, for the average size 
private firm.24  
                                                          
23 We repeat our earlier FRQP analyses using the cost of debt sample, and inferences are unchanged. 
24 Based on the assumption that the ratio of fees to assets is stable through time, we use the regression results from 
Table 7 to infer the fee data for the Sageworks data years.   
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In Panel C of Table 7, we relate the verification service differentials in basis points and 
verification fees for an average-size Sageworks sample firm. Dividing the difference in fees for a 
higher verification level by the difference in cost of debt yields the point at which the higher 
verification level becomes “profitable” (i.e., the “break even” point). Focusing on the full-fee 
sample, for a firm with total debt above $1.3 million ($2.5 million), reviews are cost-effective 
relative to compilations (audits are cost effective relative to reviews). While there are a number of 
critical assumptions that must be made for these estimates to have validity, this analysis provides 
some quantification that bears relevance for the SEC’s exemptions of some small private issuers 
(e.g., using crowd-funding) from reviews and/or audits (SEC 2016).  
5.5. Supplemental analysis—changes in verification service levels and FRQPs 
To mitigate concerns in our primary analysis that both FRQP levels and verification service 
levels are correlated with time-invariant firm characteristics, we examine the association between 
changes in verification and changes in FRQPs. Specifically, we estimate the following regression 
model, with standard errors clustered by firm: 
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  (8) 
where AssurDnAtoR (AssurUpRtoA) is an indicator that equals one if the firm decreases (increases) 
its assurance from audit (review) in year t1 to review (audit) in year t. AssurDnOther 
(AssurUpOther) is an indicator that equals one if the firm decreases (increases) its assurance in 
any other combination from year t1 to t, i.e. audit to compilation, review to compilation, or 
compilation to company-prepared (compilation to review, compilation to audit, or company-
prepared to review). Accordingly, β1-4 capture the effect of verification level changes on FRQP 
changes, relative to observations with no changes in verification (as captured by the intercept). 
Before presenting results from estimation of Eq. (8), in Panel A of Table 8 we provide 
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some descriptive data on the frequency with which our size-representative sample changes 
verification levels from year t-1 to t. For instance, a firm that changes from an audit to a review 
from one year to the next is labeled “1,” a firm that changes from a compilation to an audit is 
labeled “+2,” and a firm that changes from an audit to company-prepared is labeled “3.” Over 
95% of firm-years exhibit no change in verification level (i.e., 49,764/51,557). Among firm years 
with a change, nearly the same amount of firm years move up two levels and down two levels (238 
and 208, respectively). While there are very few firm-years that move three levels, it is more 
common to move from audit to company-prepared (42 firm years) than vice versa (9 firm years). 
Panel B of Table 8 presents results from estimating Eq. (8). To summarize, there is broad 
support for the inferences drawn in our primary analysis. First, there is no statistically significant 
change in any FRQP from changes in verification levels between audit and review, either in 
moving up from review to audit (AssurUpRtoA), or in moving down from audit to review 
(AssurDnAtoR). Second, there are statistically significant changes in FRQP (in the expected 
directions) when verification levels change across other combinations. For example, the coefficient 
estimates on AssurDnOther are significantly positive using three of the four quality proxy 
measures, suggesting a decrease in FRQP when verification decreases (other than a decrease from 
audit to review).25 In short, these results indicate that time-invariant firm characteristics are an 
unlikely explanation for our primary inferences regarding verification levels and FRQPs. 
6. Conclusion 
The relative costs and benefits of financial statement verification levels are the subject of 
increasing attention by investor advocates, regulators, and scholars. Absent from this discussion is 
empirical evidence on the relative financial reporting quality benefits across alternative 
                                                          
25 Given our low frequency of company-prepared observations, we re-ran all analyses without company-prepared 
observations and our results are unchanged (untabulated).   
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verification service levels available to private firms and potentially available to some public firms. 
In this study, we address this gap by providing evidence on the association between verification 
service levels, financial reporting quality proxies (FRQPs), and cost of debt. Further, we use 
confidential verification service fee data to approximate relative costs for the various verification 
service levels to provide some economic perspective for interpreting our FRQP results.  
We find consistent evidence that FRQPs are better (i.e., lower scores) for higher levels of 
verification. However, the biggest FRQP difference appears between compilation and review with 
an insignificant difference between review and audit. Because audits are on average about twice 
as expensive as a review, our evidence suggests that top-down, limited verification procedure 
financial statement review is a particularly cost-effective service that yields reporting quality 
scores that are comparable to an audit, on average. In contrast, we document that, relative to 
reviewed financial statements, audited financial statements are associated with significantly lower 
cost of debt. Taken together, these results suggests that cost of debt reflects benefits of audits that 
FRQPs do not capture (e.g., implicit assurance about internal controls, management attitudes, 
lower perceived risk of material financial misstatement). Results also suggest that differences in 
verification procedures across assurance levels require thoughtful analysis, and have implications 
for evaluating the cost effectiveness of review versus audit procedures that include internal control 
evaluation and detailed verification tests. 
Our study is subject to several important caveats. First, our private firm data permits 
computation only of relatively noisy FRQPs, and our cost data represent approximations. Second, 
our analysis does not purport to be a complete analysis of all costs or benefits involved in a firm’s 
choice of verification service level. Finally, although we attempt to mitigate potential endogeneity 
concerns via propensity-score-weighted regression (and a changes analysis), this approach does 
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not fully address selection bias. The maintained assumption is that unobservable (or omitted) 
variables not included the first-stage model of verification level choice do not systematically affect 
FRQPs. However, prior studies offer little guidance on the determinants of verification choice for 
private firms, which renders it difficult to directly assess the potential confounding effect of 
variables not included in the first-stage model.  
Nonetheless, overall our results provide some evidential basis for making decisions about 
verification levels for firms with alternatives, and for regulators who may be considering relaxing 
mandates for a particular verification level. Further, our results suggest that analytical procedures 
warrant further research by practitioners and scholars through advances in confirmatory data 
analytics. Finally, regulators and standard setters might consider the relative cost-benefit tradeoffs 
from high level confirmatory data analytics against intensive audit procedures for internal control 
over financial reporting.  
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Appendix A – CPA Firm Verification Service Descriptions (source: AICPA) 
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Appendix B –Verification Service Report Examples 
 
CPA Firm's Audit Report 
 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of X Company as of December 31, 20X2 and 20X1, 
and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for the years then ended. These 
financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express 
an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. 
 
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of 
America. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test 
basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes 
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable 
basis for our opinion. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above, present fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of X Company as of [at] December 31, 20X2 and 20X1, and the results of its operations 
and its cash flows for the years then ended in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in 
the United States of America. 
 
[Signature] 
[Date] 
 
CPA Firm’s Review Report 
 
I (We) have reviewed the accompanying financial statements of XYZ Company, which comprise the 
balance sheets as of December 31, 20X2 and 20X1, and the related statements of income, changes in 
stockholders' equity, and cash flows for the years then ended, and the related notes to the financial 
statements. A review includes primarily applying analytical procedures to management's (owners') 
financial data and making inquiries of company management (owners). A review is substantially less in 
scope than an audit, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion regarding the financial 
statements as a whole. Accordingly, I (we) do not express such an opinion. 
 
Management’s Responsibility for the Financial Statements 
Management (Owners) is (are) responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these financial 
statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America; 
this includes the design, implementation, and maintenance of internal control relevant to the preparation 
and fair presentation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement whether due to fraud 
or error. 
 
Accountant’s Responsibility 
My (Our) responsibility is to conduct the review engagements in accordance with Statements on 
Standards for Accounting and Review Services promulgated by the Accounting and Review Services 
Committee of the AICPA. Those standards require me (us) to perform procedures to obtain limited 
assurance as a basis for reporting whether I am (we are) aware of any material modifications that should 
be made to the financial statements for them to be in accordance with accounting principles generally 
accepted in the United States of America. I (We) believe that the results of my (our) procedures provide a 
reasonable basis for my (our) conclusion. 
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Accountant’s Conclusion 
Based on my (our) reviews, I am (we are) not aware of any material modifications that should be made to 
the accompanying financial statements in order for them to be in accordance with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of America. 
 
[Signature of accounting firm or accountant, as appropriate] 
[Accountant's city and state] 
[Date of the accountant's review report] 
 
CPA Firm’s Compilation Report 
 
Management is responsible for the accompanying financial statements of XYZ Company, which comprise 
the balance sheets as of December 31, 20X2 and 20X1 and the related statements of income, changes in 
stockholders' equity, and cash flows for the years then ended, and the related notes to the financial 
statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. I 
(We) have performed compilation engagements in accordance with Statements on Standards for 
Accounting and Review Services promulgated by the Accounting and Review Services Committee of the 
AICPA. 
 
I (We) did not audit or review the financial statements nor was (were) I (we) required to perform any 
procedures to verify the accuracy or completeness of the information provided by management. 
Accordingly, I (we) do not express an opinion, a conclusion, nor provide any form of assurance on these 
financial statements. 
 
[Signature of accounting firm or accountant, as appropriate] 
[Accountant's city and state] 
[Date of the accountant's report] 
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Appendix C - Variable Definitions 
AbAccrualsi,t Firm i’s abnormal accruals in year t, computed as the residual from estimation of a 
variant of the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model, as outlined in Eq. (6). 
We estimate the model by industry-year using two digit NAICS industry codes and 
require that at least 10 observations be available for each industry-year estimation. 
(data from Sageworks) 
|AbAccruals|i,t Firm i’s absolute abnormal accruals in year t, computed as the unsigned residual 
from AbAccruals. (data from Sageworks) 
Accrualsi,t Firm i’s year t total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, minus depreciation and 
amortization expense. (data from Sageworks) 
Assetsi,t Firm i’s year t total assets (millions). (data from Sageworks) 
Assuri,t A multinomial variable that equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 if firm i’s year t financial statements 
were company-prepared, compiled, reviewed, or audited, respectively. (data from 
Sageworks) 
AssurDnAtoRi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i decreases its level of verification from audit in 
year t1 to review in year t, and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks)  
AssurDnOtheri,t An indicator that equals one if firm i decreases its level of verification in any 
combination other than from audit to review from year t1 to t, and equals zero 
otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
AssurFeesi,t Dollar cost of firm i’s year t assurance services. (data obtained from a Midwest 
regional accounting firm for 424 client observations) 
AssurUpOtheri,t An indicator that equals one if firm i increases its level of verification in any 
combination other than from review to audit from year t1 to t, and equals zero 
otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
AssurUpRtoAi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i increases its level of verification from review 
in year t1 to audit in year t, and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
Auditi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i receives a financial statement audit in year t, 
and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
CCorpi,t An indicator that equals one if the firm is incorporated under Subchapter C of the 
Internal Revenue Code, and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
Companyi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i prepares its own financial statements without 
engaging the services of a CPA firm in year t, and equals zero otherwise. (data from 
Sageworks) 
Compilei,t An indicator that equals one if firm i receives a financial statement compilation in 
year t, and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
CostOfDebti,t+1 Firm i’s year t+1 interest expense divided by average debt outstanding in year t+1. 
(data from Sageworks) 
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CurrRatioi,t Firm i’s year t ending current assets divided by ending current liabilities. (data from 
Sageworks) 
Debti,t Firm i’s year t ending total liabilities. (data from Sageworks) 
FScorei,t A measure of financial statement misstatement likelihood, where larger values are 
associated with higher probability of material misstatement. We follow Dechow et 
al. (2011) as closely as possible given our data availability. Specifically, we 
compute FScore as [e(PredictedValue)/(1+e(PredictedValue))]/0.0037, where PredictedValue is 
computed as in our Eq. (4), and 0.0037 is the unconditional probability of financial 
misstatement, as computed in Dechow et al. (2011). In Eq. (4), rsst_acc = [(change 
in current assets – change in cash) - (current liabilities – change in current long-term 
debt) + (total assets – current assets) – (total liabilities – current liabilities – long-
term liabilities)]/average total assets; ch_rec is the change in receivables divided by 
average total assets; ch_inv is the change in inventory divided by average total 
assets; soft_assets = (total assets – net fixed assets – cash)/total assets; ch_cs is the 
percentage change in cash sales, where cash sales equals sales – change in 
receivables; ch_roa = ROAt – ROAt-1. 
FSDScorei,t Firm i’s year t financial statement deviation score, which is a measure based on 
Benford’s law that is decreasing in financial reporting quality. FSDScore is 
computed as in Eq. (3), and measures the extent to which the numbers reported in a 
given set of financial statements deviate from the theoretical distribution of numbers 
implied by Benford’s law. (data from Sageworks) 
IntCoveragei,t Firm i’s year t earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
expenses divided by interest expense. (data from Sageworks) 
Leveragei,t Firm i’s year t ending total liabilities divided by ending total assets. (data from 
Sageworks) 
NegEquityi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i’s year t ending total liabilities are greater than 
ending total assets, and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
PPEi,t Firm i’s year t ending net value of property, plant, and equipment. (data from 
Sageworks) 
PPEtai,t Firm i’s year t ending net value of property, plant, and equipment divided by 
beginning total assets. (data from Sageworks) 
Receivablesi,t Firm i’s year t ending trade receivables. (data from Sageworks) 
Reviewi,t An indicator that equals one if firm i receives a financial statement review in year t, 
and equals zero otherwise. (data from Sageworks) 
ROAi,t Firm i’s year t return on assets. (data from Sageworks) 
SalesGrowthi,t The percentage change in sales from year t1 to year t. (data from Sageworks) 
SalesGrowthSqi,t SalesGrowth squared. (data from Sageworks) 
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Table 1 – Sample Selection  
Table 1 outlines the drivers of the differential number of observations in the original Sageworks data set and the 
samples we use in this study (i.e., full and size-representative samples). 
 
Private Firm Sample (2001 - 2010) # of Firm-Years # of Firms 
   
Observations with annual accounting reports 473,739 167,475 
Observations - Canadian Firms 439,517 156,043 
Observations - financial, utilities, and missing industry 422,729 150,105 
Observations - firms with total assets < $1M; Sales <0; Equity <0 223,098 77,629 
   
Observations with available control variables - Full Sample 103,114 41,280 
Observations with available control variables – Size-Representative Sample 51,557 22,782 
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Table 2 – Verification Levels by Size and Industry 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the percentage of firm-years in each size decile in the full sample that use audit, review, and compilation as the verification level. Panel 
B of Table 2 reports for the full sample the number of firm-years in each industry category (and the corresponding industry breakdown from a sample of Compustat 
observations that meet similar data requirements spanning the same sample period 2001-2010), as well as the percentage of firm years in each industry category 
that use audit, review, and compilation as the assurance level. 
 
Panel A: Frequency of verification level by size (full sample) 
  Audit Review Compilation Company Total 
Decile Assets N Decile % N Decile % N Decile % N Decile % N 
1 20.2M - 3.1B 6,282 60.9% 2,061 20.0% 1,853 18.0% 115 1.1% 10,311 
2 11.2 - 20.2M 4,168 40.4% 4,090 39.7% 1,920 18.6% 134 1.3% 10,312 
3 7.5 - 11.2M 3,110 30.2% 4,967 48.2% 2,108 20.4% 127 1.2% 10,312 
4 5.5 - 7.5M 2,561 24.8% 5,084 49.3% 2,531 24.5% 135 1.3% 10,311 
5 4.2 - 5.5M 2,015 19.5% 5,264 51.1% 2,923 28.3% 109 1.1% 10,311 
6 3.2 - 4.2M 1,559 15.1% 5,291 51.3% 3,318 32.2% 144 1.4% 10,312 
7 2.5 - 3.2M 1,223 11.9% 5,114 49.6% 3,848 37.3% 126 1.2% 10,311 
8 1.94 - 2.5M 948 9.2% 5,045 48.9% 4,201 40.7% 118 1.1% 10,312 
9 1.47 - 1.94M 788 7.6% 4,592 44.5% 4,784 46.4% 147 1.4% 10,311 
10 1 - 1.47M 620 6.0% 4,182 40.6% 5,323 51.6% 186 1.8% 10,311 
Total  23,274  45,690  32,809  1,341  103,114 
 
Panel B: Frequency of verification level by industry (full sample) 
 Private Firm Full Sample Compustat Comparable Sample 
Industry Category N % Sample % Audit % Review % Compile %Company N % Sample Diff. 
Food Products 4,071 3.9% 26.7% 38.9% 33.2% 1.3% 1,411 2.4% 1.5% 
Beer & Liquor 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 267 0.5% -0.5% 
Tobacco Products  17 0.0% 64.7% 17.6% 17.6% 0.0% 86 0.1% -0.1% 
Recreation 3,760 3.6% 25.9% 38.3% 34.0% 1.7% 1,386 2.4% 1.3% 
Printing and Publishing 1,889 1.8% 22.1% 42.8% 34.0% 1.1% 612 1.0% 0.8% 
Consumer Goods 1,522 1.5% 26.9% 39.8% 32.4% 0.9% 847 1.4% 0.0% 
Apparel 335 0.3% 33.4% 41.8% 23.6% 1.2% 727 1.2% -0.9% 
Healthcare/Pharmacy Products 1,703 1.7% 39.9% 26.2% 31.5% 2.3% 7,223 12.4% -10.7%** 
Chemicals 932 0.9% 29.2% 41.2% 28.9% 0.8% 1,294 2.2% -1.3% 
Textiles 253 0.2% 24.1% 52.6% 22.5% 0.8% 156 0.3% 0.0% 
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Construction and Construction Materials 32,809 31.8% 20.7% 54.5% 23.9% 0.9% 1,721 2.9%       28.9%*** 
Steel Works 2,538 2.5% 27.4% 43.3% 28.9% 0.3% 892 1.5% 1.0% 
Fabricated Products/Machinery 3,644 3.5% 24.8% 43.3% 31.1% 0.8% 2,101 3.6% -0.1% 
Electrical Equipment 281 0.3% 33.8% 28.1% 37.4% 0.7% 1,050 1.8% -1.5% 
Automobiles and Trucks 442 0.4% 20.8% 49.5% 28.7% 0.9% 886 1.5% -1.1% 
Aircraft, Ships, and Railroad Equipment 511 0.5% 37.4% 25.8% 34.1% 2.7% 419 0.7% -0.2% 
Precious Industrial Metal Mining 700 0.7% 24.3% 40.3% 31.9% 3.6% 1,486 2.5% -1.9% 
Coal 245 0.2% 33.5% 40.4% 24.5% 1.6% 184 0.3% -0.1% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 167 0.2% 39.5% 9.0% 43.7% 7.8% 3,897 6.7% -6.5% 
Communication 642 0.6% 42.8% 26.6% 27.6% 3.0% 2,668 4.6% -3.9% 
Personal and Business Services 9,544 9.3% 28.4% 35.6% 34.3% 1.7% 8,851 15.1% -5.9% 
Business Equipment 712 0.7% 35.8% 32.4% 29.9% 1.8% 7,954 13.6% -12.9%*** 
Business Supplies and Shipping Containers 2,517 2.4% 24.5% 45.5% 29.0% 1.0% 836 1.4% 1.0% 
Transportation 2,201 2.1% 20.6% 44.5% 33.6% 1.3% 3,901 6.7% -4.5% 
Wholesale 15,384 14.9% 20.3% 44.6% 34.1% 1.0% 2,054 3.5% 11.4%** 
Retail 12,476 12.1% 15.0% 36.7% 46.2% 2.1% 2,757 4.7% 7.4%* 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1,625 1.6% 19.6% 30.6% 47.6% 2.2% 987 1.7% -0.1% 
Everything Else 2,194 2.1% 25.1% 41.2% 32.3% 1.4% 1,791 3.1% -0.9% 
Total 103,114 100.0%  22.6% 44.3% 31.8% 1.3% 58,444 100.0%    
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
Panels A and B of Table 3 present descriptive statistics for variables used in our analysis for the full and size-
representative samples, respectively (both for the samples as a whole, and for firm-year observations within audit, 
review, compilation and company prepared verification levels within each sample). CostOfDebt has fewer 
observations than the reported sample sizes (N) because of data limitations (41,002 and 23,778 observations for the 
full sample and size-representative samples, respectively). Panel C of Table 3 presents size-representative sample 
correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations reported above (below) the diagonal. Correlations that are 
significant at the 10% level or better are in bold. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: Full sample  
 All Obs. Audit Review Compilation Company 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
FSDScore 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.052 0.055 0.054 0.056 0.055 
FScore 0.418 0.365 0.420 0.366 0.404 0.349 0.436 0.385 0.455 0.429 
|AbAccruals| 0.099 0.069 0.096 0.064 0.099 0.070 0.101 0.071 0.117 0.082 
AbAccruals 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.010 0.019 
CostOfDebt 0.107 0.071 0.050 0.011 0.120 0.085 0.139 0.118 0.118 0.086 
Assets 9.591 4.147 19.803 9.584 6.431 3.882 6.768 2.857 9.038 3.736 
ROA 0.129 0.088 0.118 0.086 0.128 0.087 0.139 0.091 0.127 0.068 
SalesGrowth 0.197 0.026 0.372 0.080 0.158 0.021 0.128 0.000 0.152 -0.049 
SalesGrowthSq 0.612 0.068 0.846 0.078 0.505 0.055 0.588 0.086 0.740 0.184 
Debt 3.471 1.577 6.326 3.737 2.668 1.430 2.540 1.153 4.034 1.896 
Leverage 0.278 0.185 0.286 0.195 0.260 0.173 0.289 0.188 0.470 0.467 
CurrRatio 2.404 1.608 2.215 1.529 2.302 1.595 2.675 1.706 2.530 1.517 
CCorp 0.407 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.427 0.000 
PPEta 0.621 0.461 0.584 0.437 0.628 0.469 0.641 0.471 0.536 0.338 
NegEquity 0.078 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.131 0.000 
IntCoverage 8.731 1.527 8.657 1.214 9.030 1.829 8.423 1.385 7.361 0.790 
N 103,114 23,274 45,690 32,809 1,341 
 
Panel B: Size-representative sample  
 All Obs. Audit Review Compilation Company 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
FSDScore 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.051 0.053 0.052 0.055 0.054 0.056 0.054 
FScore 0.426 0.375 0.416 0.361 0.411 0.357 0.459 0.412 0.479 0.450 
|AbAccruals| 0.099 0.069 0.100 0.068 0.097 0.068 0.100 0.068 0.119 0.084 
AbAccruals 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.023 
CostOfDebt 0.104 0.078 0.073 0.049 0.108 0.082 0.120 0.092 0.104 0.085 
Assets 5.369 4.751 6.128 5.786 5.325 4.702 4.907 4.220 5.330 4.714 
ROA 0.134 0.089 0.121 0.085 0.134 0.090 0.142 0.093 0.140 0.070 
SalesGrowth 0.217 0.042 0.251 0.045 0.205 0.043 0.215 0.040 0.243 0.022 
SalesGrowthSq 0.579 0.062 0.635 0.071 0.518 0.051 0.636 0.079 0.812 0.188 
Debt 2.433 1.882 2.787 2.117 2.363 1.856 2.274 1.782 3.083 2.427 
Leverage 0.274 0.184 0.258 0.163 0.268 0.186 0.286 0.186 0.470 0.495 
CurrRatio 2.321 1.576 2.278 1.575 2.199 1.550 2.560 1.639 2.432 1.500 
CCorp 0.400 0.000 0.462 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.445 0.000 
PPEta 0.612 0.448 0.611 0.456 0.612 0.452 0.617 0.441 0.520 0.331 
NegEquity 0.073 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.109 0.000 
IntCoverage 8.888 1.629 8.846 1.135 9.146 1.927 8.542 1.513 7.132 0.579 
N 51,557 10,468 25,720 14,728 641 
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Table 3, continued 
 
Panel C: Size-representative sample correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) above (below) the diagonal 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Audit (1)   -0.50 -0.32 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.20 0.17 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Review (2) -0.50   -0.63 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.02 
Compile(3) -0.32 -0.63   0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
FSDScore (4) -0.03 -0.03 0.06   -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.15 0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 
FScore (5) -0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.04   0.29 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 -0.45 -0.04 0.01 
AbAccruals (6) -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.27   -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 
|AbAccruals| (7) -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03   0.02 -0.05 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.09 
CostOfDebt (8) -0.26 -0.08 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04   -0.66 0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.69 -0.37 0.25 0.02 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 
Assets (9) 0.17 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.77   -0.02 0.14 0.10 0.50 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 
ROA (10) -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.14 0.12 -0.01   0.13 0.06 -0.21 -0.14 0.19 -0.22 0.07 -0.18 0.48 
SalesGrowth (11) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.20   0.85 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 
SalesGrowthSq (12) 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.28   0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.02 
Debt (13) 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.88 0.49 -0.21 0.04 0.02   0.58 -0.33 -0.01 0.09 0.41 -0.27 
Leverage (14) -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.19 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.35 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.00 0.62   -0.22 -0.02 0.29 0.38 -0.31 
CurrRatio (15) 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.29 -0.04 0.25 -0.04 -0.05 -0.50 -0.31   -0.03 -0.06 -0.16 0.18 
CCorp (16) 0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.23 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01   0.01 -0.03 -0.14 
PPEta (17) -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.50 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.31 -0.08 0.02   0.08 -0.05 
NegEquity (18) 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.18 -0.04 -0.19 -0.04 0.01 0.30 0.29 -0.28 -0.03 0.05   -0.15 
IntCoverage (19) -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.62 0.13 0.02 -0.21 -0.18 0.19 -0.13 0.07 -0.20   
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Table 4 – Verification Service Levels and Financial Reporting Quality Proxies 
 
Table 4 presents results using the size-representative sample of OLS estimation of Eq. (1) using four alternative FRQPs as the dependent variable, as well as a 
variant of Eq. (1) that uses propensity score weighting (PSW). Review, Audit, and Compile are indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s annual financial 
statements received a review, audit, and compilation, respectively, and zero otherwise, which reflect effects relative to Company (i.e., company-prepared financial 
statements, which is the omitted category). All variables are further defined in Appendix C. Where indicated, industry and year fixed effects (including the intercept) 
are included but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, where standard errors clustered by firm 
are reported below the associated coefficient estimates. 
 
 
Dep. Var.: FSDScore FScore |AbAccruals| AbAccruals 
Method: OLS PSW OLS PSW OLS PSW OLS PSW 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Compile -0.0021*** -0.0007 0.0157** -0.0048 -0.0141*** -0.0146*** -0.0006 -0.0028 
 0.0007 0.0013 0.0094 0.0155 0.0044 0.0050 0.0055 0.0094 
Review -0.0041*** -0.0028** -0.0403*** -0.0647*** -0.0187*** -0.0199*** -0.0063 -0.0089 
  0.0007 0.0013 0.0093 0.0154 0.0043 0.0050 0.0055 0.0093 
Audit -0.0045*** -0.0031*** -0.0398*** -0.0601*** -0.0167*** -0.0165*** -0.0078* -0.0122* 
  0.0007 0.0013 0.0096 0.0156 0.0044 0.0050 0.0056 0.0094 
LnAssets 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0021 -0.0099*** -0.0102*** -0.0020* -0.0012 
  0.0002 0.0004 0.0029 0.0033 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0017 
SalesGrowthSq 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0010** 0.0006 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0010 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
Leverage -0.0083*** -0.0080*** 0.1375*** 0.1371*** 0.0254*** 0.0264*** 0.0299*** 0.0266*** 
  0.0003 0.0005 0.0053 0.0058 0.0021 0.0024 0.0025 0.0032 
CurrRatio 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0166*** -0.0167*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0068*** 0.0067*** 
  0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
CCorp -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 0.0065*** 0.0052** -0.0059*** -0.0066*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 
  0.0002 0.0002 0.0026 0.0029 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0013 
PPEta -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.2209*** -0.2222*** 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0056*** -0.0057*** 
  0.0002 0.0003 0.0028 0.0030 0.0010 0.0011 0.0013 0.0015 
NegEquity 0.0025*** 0.0024*** -0.0582*** -0.0585*** 0.0305*** 0.0317*** -0.0323*** -0.0315*** 
  0.0003 0.0003 0.0047 0.0053 0.0022 0.0027 0.0026 0.0031 
IntCoverage 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Fixed Effects I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y 
N 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 
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R2 4.46% 4.44% 26.06% 26.80% 4.97% 5.11% 2.41% 2.32% 
F-tests:         
(Compile-Review) 144.06*** 137.12*** 238.45*** 260.58*** 21.22*** 5.01** 27.05*** 20.51** 
(Compile-Audit) 150.69*** 161.76*** 231.17*** 234.15*** 6.30** 24.28*** 36.90*** 31.01*** 
(Review-Audit)  9.25*** 3.11* 1.75 1.54 1.67 3.53* 1.72 1.19 
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Table 5 – Inventory Percentage Subsamples 
 
Table 5 presents results of OLS estimation of Eq. (1) using the size-representative sample with four alternative FRQPs, separately for sample partitions based on 
the 75th percentile of inventory percentage (i.e., inventory-to-total-assets). Review, Audit, and Compile are indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s annual 
financial statements received a review, audit, and compilation, respectively, and zero otherwise, which reflect effects relative to Company (i.e., company-prepared 
financial statements, which is the omitted category). All variables are further defined in Appendix C. Where indicated, industry and year fixed effects (including 
the intercept) are included but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, where standard errors 
clustered by firm are reported below the associated coefficient estimates. 
 
 
Inventory %: Low-to-Mid range High 
Dep. Var.: FSDScore FScore |AbAccruals| AbAccruals FSDScore FScore |AbAccruals| AbAccruals 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Compile -0.0019** -0.0062 -0.0228*** -0.0040 -0.0020** 0.0701*** 0.0086 0.0023 
 0.0009 0.0124 0.0056 0.0073 0.0010 0.0140 0.0078 0.0062 
Review -0.0039*** -0.0595*** -0.0284*** -0.0067 -0.0038*** -0.0229** -0.0036 -0.0019 
  0.0009 0.0124 0.0056 0.0073 0.0010 0.0139 0.0078 0.0062 
Audit -0.0041*** -0.0505*** -0.0273*** -0.0074 -0.0059*** -0.0612*** -0.0082* -0.0093* 
  0.0009 0.0126 0.0057 0.0074 0.0010 0.0147 0.0061 0.0065 
LnAssets 0.0000 -0.0050* -0.0106*** -0.0029** 0.0000 0.0156*** 0.0007 -0.0068*** 
  0.0002 0.0033 0.0012 0.0016 0.0004 0.0051 0.0021*** 0.0019 
SalesGrowthSq 0.0002*** 0.0090*** 0.0039*** 0.0015*** 0.0006*** 0.0030** -0.0002 0.0023*** 
  0.0001 0.0011 0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 0.0015 0.0008 0.0006 
Leverage -0.0084*** 0.1138*** 0.0217*** 0.0231*** -0.0088*** 0.1663*** 0.0427*** 0.0353*** 
  0.0004 0.0066 0.0026 0.0032 0.0006 0.0082 0.0040 0.0035 
CurrRatio 0.0003*** -0.0175*** -0.0002 0.0066*** 0.0000 -0.0119*** 0.0072*** 0.0041*** 
  0.0001 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0012 0.0006 0.0005 
CCorp -0.0021*** 0.0032 -0.0067*** 0.0169*** -0.0023*** 0.0154*** 0.0148*** -0.0038** 
  0.0002 0.0030 0.0011 0.0013 0.0003 0.0045 0.0018 0.0017 
PPEta -0.0013*** -0.1973*** -0.0016* -0.0023* -0.0022*** -0.2584*** 0.0017 -0.0014 
  0.0002 0.0030 0.0011 0.0015 0.0005 0.0090 0.0033 0.0027 
NegEquity 0.0027*** -0.0557*** 0.0278*** -0.0288*** 0.0018*** -0.0595*** -0.0392*** 0.0392*** 
  0.0004 0.0057 0.0026 0.0031 0.0006 0.0076 0.0045 0.0042 
IntCoverage 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0006*** -0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0011*** 0.0002** 0.0005*** 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Fixed Effects I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y 
N 38,667 38,667 38,667 38,667 12,890 12,890 12,890 12,890 
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R2 4.41% 23.60% 4.11% 2.20% 5.42% 22.78% 4.54% 5.94% 
F-tests:         
(Compile-Review) 99.16*** 343.01*** 23.69*** 2.98* 31.28*** 38.87*** 19.54*** 35.43*** 
(Compile-Audit) 103.90*** 160.21*** 10.64** 3.23* 34.09*** 216.67*** 44.87*** 134.58*** 
(Review-Audit)  0.89 0.09 0.71 0.19 3.79* 20.61*** 4.66** 2.94* 
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Table 6 – Verification Service Levels and Cost of Debt 
Table 6 presents results using the size-representative sample of OLS estimation of Eq. (1) using CostOfDebt in year 
t+1 as the dependent variable, as well as a variant of Eq. (1) that uses propensity score weighting (PSW). Review, 
Audit, and Compile are indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s annual financial statements received a review, 
audit, and compilation, respectively, and zero otherwise, which reflect effects relative to Company (i.e., company-
prepared financial statements, which is the omitted category). All variables are further defined in Appendix C. Where 
indicated, industry and year fixed effects (including the intercept) are included but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, where standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported below the associated coefficient estimates. 
 
Method: OLS OLS PSW 
Dep. Var.: CostOfDebt CostOfDebt CostOfDebt 
Column: (1) (2) (3) 
Compile   -0.0021 -0.0049 
   0.0044 0.0130 
Review   -0.0083** -0.0169* 
    0.0044 0.0130 
Audit -0.0077*** -0.0136*** -0.0198* 
  0.0010 0.0044 0.0131 
LnAssets -0.1308*** -0.1306*** -0.1310*** 
  0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 
SalesGrowthSq 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 
  0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 
Leverage -0.0768*** -0.0770*** -0.0760*** 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 
CurrRatio 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 
  0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
CCorp 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0033*** 
  0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 
PPEta 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0045*** 
  0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
NegEquity -0.0176*** -0.0176*** -0.0182*** 
  0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 
IntCoverage 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fixed Effects I,Y I,Y I,Y 
N 23,778 23,778 23,778 
R2 68.58% 68.59% 67.91% 
Difference in basis points    
Compilation – Review  0.0062 0.0120 
Compilation – Audit  0.0115 0.0149 
Review - Audit  0.0053 0.0028 
(Compile-Review) F-test  72.88*** 103.11*** 
(Compile-Audit) F-test  300.16*** 137.12*** 
(Review-Audit) F-test  24.02*** 10.58*** 
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Table 7 – Implied Verification Service Fees  
Panel A of Table 7 presents results of OLS estimation of Eq. (7) using confidential assurance fee data obtained from 
a Midwest regional accounting firm. Compile, Review, and Audit are indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s 
annual financial statements received a compilation, review, and audit, respectively, and zero otherwise. All variables 
are further defined in Appendix C. *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, where standard errors are reported below the associated coefficient estimates. Panel B of Table 7 uses 
coefficient estimates presented in Panel A to compute average fees for verification levels, holding firm size at the 
sample mean. 
 
Panel A: Regression results 
Sample: Full-Fee Size-Representative Fee 
Dep. Var.: AssurFees AssurFees 
Column: (1) (2) 
Compile 5,514*** 3,126* 
  551 2,076 
Review 14,522*** 13,651*** 
  1,022 1,926 
Audit 23,584*** 22,532*** 
  2,117 3,100 
Compile*Assets 0.1334*** 0.8646** 
  0.0061 0.4905 
Review*Assets 0.0043 0.2759 
 0.0910 0.4312 
Audit*Assets 0.2079** 0.7837 
 0.0996 0.6591 
N 424 179 
R2 65.40% 72.04% 
 
Panel B: Economic magnitudes 
Sample: Full Fee Size-Representative Fee 
Verification Level Compile Review Audit Compile Review Audit 
Average cost based on mean assets $6,417 $14,550 $27,702 $7,368 $15,120 $27,726 
Percentage increase (Compile to Review)  127%   105%  
Percentage increase (Compile to Audit)  332%   276%  
Percentage increase (Review to Audit)  90%   83%  
Note: For both samples, the difference between a Review and Compilation as a percentage of the difference between 
an Audit and Compilation is 38%. 
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Panel C:  Cost/benefit analysis  
Verification difference ΔBasis Points ΔFees ΔFees / ΔBasis Points 
    
Full sample (n=424)    
Review - Compilation 0.0062 $8,133 $1,308,978 
Audit  - Review 0.0053 $13,152 $2,466,997 
     
Size-representative sample (n=179)     
Review - Compilation 0.0062 $7,752 $1,247,719 
Audit - Review 0.0053 $12,606 $2,364,569 
Note: ΔBasis Points and ΔFees are from Table 6, column 2, and Table 7, panel B, respectively.  
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Table 8 – Changes in Verification Service Levels and Financial Reporting Quality Proxies 
Panel A of Table 8 presents descriptive data on the frequency of firm-year observations in the size-representative 
sample that change verification levels year-over year, where 0 reflects no change in verification level, +N (-N) reflects 
increasing (decreasing) verification by N levels (e.g., “+1” indicates an increase from compilation to review or review 
to audit). Panel B of Table 8 presents results of OLS estimation of Eq. (8), where the change operator denotes annual 
change from year t1 to t. FSDScore is a Benford’s Law-based measure that is decreasing in financial reporting 
quality. |AbAccruals| are unsigned abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model. All variables are further defined 
in Appendix C. Industry and year fixed effects (including the intercept) are included but not reported. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, where standard errors clustered by firm 
are reported below the associated coefficient estimates. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive change frequencies 
 Firm-years with various levels of increase (+) or decrease (-) in verification in 
year t relative to t1 
Verification Level in Year t1 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Company-Prepared    431 48 14 9 
Compile   92 14,224 555 224  
Review  76 324 24,972 98   
Audit 42 132 179 10,137    
Total 42 208 595 49,764 701 238 9 
 
Panel B: Regression output 
Dep. Var.: ΔFSDScore ΔFScore Δ|AbAccruals| ΔAbAccruals 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AssurDnAtoR -0.0165 0.0603 -0.0602 0.1932 
 0.0200 0.0591 0.2100 0.1858 
AssurDnOther 0.0531*** 0.0110 0.3088** 0.1689* 
 0.0168 0.0525 0.1813 0.1183 
AssurUpRtoA -0.0358 -0.0610 0.1428 0.1187 
 0.0384 0.1202 0.3402 0.3265 
AssurUpOther -0.0208* -0.0536* 0.0175 -0.1270 
 0.0129 0.0382 0.1322 0.1126 
ΔLnAssets 0.0086 1.6417*** 1.2678*** -0.1357** 
  0.0087 0.0286 0.0882 0.0735 
ΔSalesGrowthSq -0.0113*** -0.0341*** -0.0708*** 0.0646*** 
  0.0015 0.0049 0.0162 0.0134 
ΔLeverage -0.0088*** 0.0397*** 0.0276*** 0.0342*** 
  0.0008 0.0027 0.0089 0.0073 
ΔCurrRatio 0.0074*** -0.0181*** -0.0106 0.3331*** 
  0.0020 0.0068 0.0205 0.0172 
ΔCCorp -0.0417*** 0.0766*** -0.1431*** 0.2306*** 
  0.0040 0.0142 0.0433 0.0358 
ΔPPEta -0.0116*** -0.1965*** 0.0031 -0.0305*** 
 0.0012 0.0034 0.0130 0.0109 
ΔNegEquity 0.0079* -0.0555*** 0.6146*** -0.1601*** 
 0.0061 0.0207 0.0648 0.0535 
ΔIntCoverage 0.0020*** -0.0020* 0.0176*** -0.0009 
 0.0004 0.0012 0.0046 0.0038 
Fixed Effects I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y 
N 51,557 51,557 51,557 51,557 
R2 1.03% 12.92% 0.91% 0.97% 
  
